GNSS Deception for Counter-Drone Systems

GNSS deception presents false satellite-navigation signals to make a receiver accept an incorrect position or time solution. Jamming interferes with reception and may prevent a valid fix. Neither guarantees a particular aircraft response, and deception does not provide command-link control.

It does not directly affect visual or inertial navigation. A drone that does not rely on GNSS may continue its mission. For an assessment, identify the aircraft’s navigation methods and fallback behaviour rather than assuming every drone will respond to a false GNSS solution.

Band coverage and working distance are separate specifications. Additional bands address more navigation signals; they do not establish a greater effective radius. Specify the required navigation bands and request working-distance evidence with its applicable test conditions separately.

A drone can receive GNSS signals without transmitting a control or telemetry link. RF silence therefore does not establish immunity to GNSS deception, although passive RF detection may not locate it. The potential effect still depends on GNSS reliance, receiver checks and flight-controller behaviour.

Portable and fixed-site GNSS units support GPS L1 and GLONASS L1 as standard. Additional bands depend on configuration, and the fixed-site unit supports wall or pole mounting. State your required bands and deployment format when requesting a quotation so the proposed configuration can be confirmed.

Share your application, aircraft navigation information, required GNSS bands, existing detection and verification equipment, and preferred portable or fixed-site format with SIFT. Define the aircraft response you need to evaluate and the evidence required for acceptance. Ask for integration responsibilities and any FAT or SAT activities to be specified in the quotation.